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Abstract: Some authors propose that gender norms pose divergent effects on generosity, usually being women the 
gender expected to be kinder. Indeed, some economic experiments show women to be more generous than men in the 
Dictator Game (DG). Despite some claiming these results to be determined by socialization into gender norms, data do 
not speak against a biological explanation of sex differences. In fact, there is evidence that DG generosity varies with the 
level of pre-natal exposure to testosterone and estrogens, as indirectly measured using participants´ 2D:4D digit ratios. 
In any case, it is unclear whether DG generosity expresses pure altruism or compliance with social norms. Socialization 
and biological factors may have diverse effects on these two different motivations. In the present study, we aimed at 
contributing to this discussion. We randomly assigned participants to two independent conditions. In the prescriptive 
norm condition, participants were incentivized to accurately estimate others´ opinion about the most socially appropriate 
option in the DG (i.e., the prescriptive norm), and then made their decisions as dictators. Participants in the control 
conditions made their decisions as dictators without any prior estimation. We found that the normative exercise 
increased generosity (relative to the control condition) in women but not in men. In a sub-sample, we also measured 
participants´ 2D:4D digit ratios as a proxy of a socialization-free sex-dimorphic hormonal influence on behavior. We 
found no evidence that the normative effect of the estimation exercise was modulated by participants´ digit ratios. In 
contrast, generosity in the control condition was higher, the more extreme (highest and lowest) the digit ratios were. We 
conclude in favor of: 1) a socialization-modulated gender effect on responses to prescriptive norms of generosity; and 2) 
a biological effect of pre-natal hormonal levels on generosity when the norm was not elicited; in this last case, the 
relationship between pre-natal testosterone and empathic concern might be involved.  
Keywords: Other-regarding preferences, Altruism, Gender, Digit ratio. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The socio-psychological literature on social norms 
makes the distinction between descriptive and 
prescriptive or injunctive norms [1, 2]. These categories 
refer to people´s expectations about what most people 
do and what people believe it is the socially appropriate 
thing to do, respectively [3]. Converging lines of 
evidence from cultural anthropology [4-6] and sociology 
[7], through social psychology [8, 9] and behavioral 
economics [10-12], to neuroscience [13, 14] suggest 
that people follow norms at levels that could not be 
predicted from selfish instrumental reasons alone. 
Indeed, social norms have been shown to influence a 
myriad of behaviors relevant to vital societal issues, 
such as, voting [15], tax collection [16], bribery [17, 18], 
littering [19], cheating [20], and stealing [21], among 
others. Therefore, understanding how and when norms 
affect behavior could mean a relevant step towards 
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improving social welfare and adequately orienting 
policy decisions. We here focused on the effect of 
prescriptive norms on economic decisions in a non-
strategic context, namely the Dictator Game (DG).  
There are different variants of the DG, but at its core 
lays a unilateral decision with payoff consequences for 
the decision maker and a passive associated 
participant. In this context, decisions can be seen as 
more or less generous depending on the relative payoff 
each gets. Despite the selfish rational choice involves 
the dictator keeping the whole pie for herself, modal 
transfers are typically greater than zero, and many 
dictators even transfer half the endowment (see [22] for 
a meta-analysis of DG results). Avoidance of large 
departures from the norm of fair share is a motivation 
that may underlie non-selfish decisions in the DG [23, 
24]. In line with this, the Morality Salience Hypothesis 
posits that prosociality in games such as the DG is 
driven by a generalized morality preference that 
motivates people to do what they think is morally right 
[25-27], and recent reports indeed show that making 
participants think of what they believe is morally best in 
the game induces greater altruism [28]. 
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In addition to egalitarian norms for sharing material 
resources, differences between women and men, and 
gender and its associated norms and stereotypes have 
attracted the attention of researchers as possible 
proximate factors moderating generosity and altruism 
in economic games [29-32]. Willer, Wimer, Lindsay, 
and Owens [33] mention that gender is among the 
most consistent demographic predictors of charitable 
giving, being women typically more generous than 
men. Earlier meta-analyses in the social psychological 
literature on pro-social behaviors suggest, in contrast, 
that men help more than women in the context of short-
term encounters with strangers [34], that is, a situation 
similar to a DG. In turn, there is no consensus 
regarding who is the more generous gender in the 
experimental economics literature. Engel´s [22] meta-
analysis of DG decisions showed women to be more 
generous than men, though Niederle [31] cautioned 
about that result because the vast majority of studies 
reviewed by Engel did not report participants´ gender, 
which could hide a publication bias. In sum, some 
economic experiments report women´s DG giving to be 
greater than that of men (e.g., [32, 35-38]); but, this 
pattern is not always found (e.g., [39-42]) and can even 
reverse [41, 43].  
Eagly [44] and Wood and Eagly [45] propose that 
gender norms derive from the division of labor between 
women and men and the subsequent inference that 
each gender has intrinsic qualities making it especially 
apt for specific tasks. In industrialized societies, women 
are typically expected to be more communally oriented 
and to show caring and unselfish behaviors, whereas 
men are expected to show instrumental, autonomous, 
and independent attitudes [46, 47]. In fact, there is 
evidence from economic experiments showing that 
women are expected to be more generous than men 
[32, 48]. If this represents general social expectations, 
women and men may usually live under the pressure to 
conform to such social stereotypes, and may even 
show such inclinations in laboratory economic games 
[49, 50].  
According to the Social Heuristic Hypothesis, 
participants bring to the laboratory and enact in 
economic experiments everyday successful strategies 
[49]. Rand and collaborators [50] claim that participants 
are even more prone to apply their common heuristics 
in the lab if they are prompted to act unreflectively (this 
is so because reflection may inhibit automatic routines 
[51]). Given gender norms prescribing communal and 
unselfish behaviors in women [46], Rand, Brescoll, 
Everett, Capraro, and Barcelo [52] predicted and found 
that experimental procedures inducing intuitive (in 
contrast to reflective) responses led women, but not 
men, towards higher sharing in the DG. Moreover, this 
effect was moderated by participants´ explicit sex role 
identification, namely the extent to which they identify 
themselves with their sex-corresponding gender 
stereotype [52]. From this, the authors concluded in 
favor of a socialization pathway leading women 
towards increased generosity. Despite Rand et al.´s 
[52] findings being consistent with a gender effect on 
DG, we believe that their data do not exclude biological 
sexual differences as effective variables. Indeed, sex 
role identification can correlate with a person´s 2D:4D 
digit ratios [53-55], which is a sex-dimorphic proxy of 
pre-natal exposure to testosterone and estrogens [56]. 
Moreover, some authors claim that women show an 
innate tendency to be more empathic than men (e.g., 
see [57]), which may underlie gender differences in 
pro-sociality and altruism. 
The goal of the present study was to contribute to 
the discussion on whether differences in the effect of 
norms on DG generosity between women and men can 
be modulated by biological sexual differences. In the 
heart of Gender Roles Theory, authors recognize that 
the effects of gender roles on behavior could be 
modulated by pre- and post-natal hormonal processes 
[44, 45], meaning that, as it has been shown for other 
social preferences such as cooperation [58], norm 
compliance may be affected by the interaction of social 
and biological events. In fact, various studies have 
found a relationship between people´s digit ratios and 
their generosity in DGs (briefly reviewed in [59] but also 
see 42, 60). However, decisions in the DG may not be 
straightforward to interpret. Despite the simplicity of the 
game, diverse motivations may underlie DG decisions, 
which do not unambiguously express a preference for 
altruism but may also reflect an inclination to comply 
with salient social norms [61]. The present study 
contributes to assessing whether participants´ digit 
ratios predict their DG generosity in situations with 
more or less salient norms.  
With this goal in mind, we investigated the extent to 
which participants´ responses to the prescriptive norm 
in the DG were modulated by their 2D:4D digit ratios as 
a socialization-free proxy of sex hormonal influences 
on behavior, and compared this against a control group 
which made DG decisions without any prior normative 
exercise. The 2D:4D digit ratio is the length of the index 
finger divided by the length of the ring finger of a 
person´s hand. Digit ratios within a given population 
typically show sexual dimorphism: males usually have 
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lower digit ratios than females [56]. This sex difference 
has been linked to higher pre-natal exposure to 
testosterone in men than in women, and the reverse for 
estrogens (see [56]). Also important, it is the fact that 
pre-natal exposure to these hormones is not 
systematically linked to their presently circulating levels 
[62]. Not only that, but digit ratios have been 
associated with various social behaviors, such as, for 
example, aggression, competitiveness [56], and, 
especially relevant for present purposes, DG decisions 
[59, 63, 64].  
In the present study, we implemented two 
independent treatments. In the prescriptive norm 
condition, participants had to guess others´ opinion 
about which was the most socially appropriate option in 
the DG before making their decisions as dictators. It is 
common that people perceive a fairness norm -which 
prescribes a 50-50 sharing rule-as applying to the DG 
[23, 24]. The present design allows assessing the 
extent to which focusing participants´ attention on the 
prescriptive norm affect their DG decision, and, to our 
knowledge, is the first study to evaluate whether such 
normative effect depends on gender and can be 
modulated by different levels of pre-natal exposure to 
sexual hormones.  
According to Norm Focus Theory, the cognitive 
accessibility of normative information is a crucial factor 
determining its efficacy on behavior [19]. Therefore, we 
expected participants in the prescriptive norm condition 
to be more generous than those in the control condition 
(see [65]). In addition, under the assumption of the 
Social Heuristic Hypothesis [50] that participants enact 
everyday successful strategies in the lab, we expected 
the activation of the prescriptive (fair-share) norm to 
have a more pronounced effect in women than in men, 
given presumed divergent gender norms in society [46, 
52]. If the effect of the prescriptive norm on DG 
decisions is modulated by participants´ digit ratios, it 
would be evidence in favor of a socialization-free effect 
of pre-natal hormones on norm compliance. Otherwise, 
we would feel inclined to attribute a difference in the 
prescriptive effect on generosity between women and 
men to socialization into gender roles.  
2. METHODS 
Participants and Task 
Present protocols were reviewed and approved by 
the Bioethical Committee of the Hospital Municipal “Dr. 
Leónidas Lucero”, Bahía Blanca, Argentina. 178 
undergraduates participated in this experiment (mean 
age ±1SD = 23 ±4 years old; 55% women) at the 
Universidad Nacional del Sur, Bahía Blanca, Argentina, 
in the second semester of 2015, the first semester of 
2016, and the second semester of 2017. Participants 
were recruited via e-mail invitations from a pre-
registered subject pool consisting of undergraduate 
and graduate students from different educational 
institutions in Bahía Blanca.  
We ran eight sessions, and each participant took 
part just once. Experimental sessions were always run 
on either Tuesdays, Wednesdays, or Thursdays at the 
same time of the day (12:30) and place (Universidad 
Nacional del Sur), using paper and pencil, and lasted 
for approximately 45 min. Participants received $25 
(approx. u$s 2.5 at the time of the study) as show-up 
fee. 
Upon arrival, participants seated in individual chairs, 
and the session began with a brief oral presentation, 
including basic details about the DG and how roles 
were assigned. Participants were told that they would 
play with another participant present in the room, but 
that they would not be able to identify each other during 
or after the session. Following the procedure used by 
Krupka and Weber [65], in all conditions, participants 
were informed that they would make their DG decisions 
as proposers without knowing their actual role. 
Participants were informed that they would know the 
role randomly assigned to them at the end of the 
session, at the moment of receiving their payment. 
Throughout the session, however, we emphasized that 
participants’ decisions would only affect payoffs if they 
were later assigned the role A (proposer); on the 
contrary, if they were later assigned the role B 
(receiver), decisions made in role A would be 
inconsequential. 
After that, participants received the written 
instructions which included every detail participants 
needed to know about the game (decision options, 
payoffs, the consequences of role assignment, etc) and 
how the session would unfold. To ensure 
understanding of the instructions, we asked 
participants to answer a series of control questions 
which were individually checked before participants 
could proceed to make their decisions (see an English 
translation of the written instruction on request).  
The procedure used here was based on the 
prescriptive focus condition done by Krupka and Weber 
[65]. They used a two-options DG in which US 
university students could choose an equitable share 
($5 to the proposer and $5 to the receiver) or a selfish 
socially inefficient option ($7 for the proposer and $1 
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for the receiver). In the present procedure, instead of 
Krupka and Weber´s dichotomous DG, we used a 
continuous DG in which each participant had to divide 
$501 between her/himself and her/his associated 
participant. To make the decision, a participant had to 
write two numbers to fill the following sentence: “I 
choose to keep $_ and that B keeps $_”. 
We ran two independent conditions: the Control 
condition (n=66), and the Prescriptive Norm condition 
(PN; n=112).2 In the Control condition, participants, 
first, decided as proposers in a $50-pie DG, and, 
second, responded a post-decision questionnaire. In 
condition PN, participants were first asked to accurately 
estimate others´ modal opinion about which was the 
most socially appropriate decision in the DG; second, 
they made their decisions as proposers in the $50-pie 
DG; and last, they responded the post-decision 
questionnaire.  
The initial estimation exercise in condition PN 
involved guessing, for each of ten ranges of 
distributions (money the dictator could keep for 
her/himself in increments of 5: $0-5, $6-10,…, $46-50), 
the percentage of previous participants who had 
chosen it as the most socially appropriate decision 
range. In condition PN, some participants (n=76) could 
win a bonus payment of $25, if, first, chose the proper 
range as the most chosen, and, second, their 
estimation did not differ by more than three percentage 
points from the percentage of control participants that 
had chosen that range. For other participants in 
                                            
1 The sign “$” always refers to Argentine pesos in this article. 
2 Krupka and Weber [65] incentivized the accurate estimation of the 
prescriptive norm, thus implying that two aspects of their protocol differed 
between the normative condition and the control condition: 1) the estimation of 
the prescriptive norm; and 2) the possibility of obtaining an extra monetary 
earning before making the DG decision. This feature of their protocol is 
methodologically problematic to securely infer a normative effect, because the 
non-normative factor could have been effective. To control for this, in the first 
five sessions of this experiment, we had three independent conditions that 
differed in the event prior to the DG decision: 1) in condition PN (for 
Prescriptive Norm), participants were incentivized to accurately estimate the 
prescriptive norm (n=36); 2) in condition PN_WO, participants had to estimate 
the prescriptive norm but were not incentivized to do it accurately (WO for 
WithOut incentive; n=36); and 3) in the control condition, there was no prior 
event (n=24). A Kruskal Wallis ANOVA by Ranks comparing the decisions 
among the three conditions (PN, PN_WO, and control) showed significant 
differences (χ2=7.91, df=2, P<0.05). After the normative estimation, participants 
in condition PN decided to keep a smaller amount of money than participants in 
the control condition (Mann-Whitney U test, U=235, Z=2.79, P<0.01). DG 
decisions in condition PN_WO were more generous than in the control as well 
(Mann-Whitney U test, U=286.5, Z=2.228, P=0.02), and the comparison of the 
amount of money kept between conditions PN_WO and PN showed no 
significant differences (Mann-Whitney U test, U= 594.5, Z=-0.90, P=0.36). This 
pattern of results thus suggests that the estimation exercise had a normative 
effect on generosity irrespective of whether it was monetarily incentivized or 
not. Given the lack of significant difference between conditions PN and 
PN_WO, for the remaining analyses in this paper we pulled together the data 
from these two conditions, thus having nPN=112. 
condition PN (n=36), the normative estimation was not 
incentivized. Because we found no differences 
between the effect of incentivized and non-incentivized 
estimations on decisions, we pooled these participants 
together as explained in footnote #2. All participants in 
condition PN were told that the right answer for the 
estimation exercise was written in a sheet which was 
inside an envelope that was placed on a desk in the 
front, and that it was going to be opened and showed 
to them at the end of the session.  
Post-decision questionnaires asked for the (non-
incentivized) estimation of the DG descriptive norm in 
the session (estimation of the modal decision in the 
DG), each participant´s personal norm (their opinion 
about what was the most socially appropriate decision 
in the DG), and socio-demographic information 
(gender, age, number of known participants in the 
session, number of previous participations in economic 
experiments, among others). 
Finally, we were interested in measuring 
participants´ 2D:4D digit ratios. With this goal in mind, 
participants from the last three sessions had their two 
hands scanned just before payment (Control condition, 
n=42; PN condition, n=42). Before we began scanning 
hands, we again explained participants that their 
participation was voluntary, and that we needed to 
scan their hands to obtain their digit ratios, which was a 
measure that had been correlated with some 
behaviors. We reassured again the anonymity of the 
stored data and confidentiality in their use. No 
participant refused to have her/his hands scanned.  
We followed Neyse and Brañas-Garza´s [66] guide 
for obtaining and measuring digit ratios. The scanner 
used was an Epson Perfection v350, all scans were 
made in color and in a 300 dpi resolution. As 
participants finished filling out the post-decision 
questionnaire, they were asked to form a line in front of 
the scanner where they were met by two of the 
experimenters. One of the experimenters operated the 
computer (which had a screen that was out of the 
participant’s sight) while the other received the socio-
demographic form, wrote the participant’s code in a 
piece of paper, and instructed the participant to place 
both hands flat in the scanner over the code paper 
(which was placed in a bottom corner of the scanner). 
We ran a “preview” of the scanned hands to make sure 
they were placed properly, and aided the participant to 
re-frame them if they were not. We repeated this 
procedure until we obtained a clear and full image of 
the participant’s hands. After making sure the hands 
were framed properly, we proceeded to scan the hands 
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in a 300 dpi resolution and checked the scanned image 
before instructing the participant to return to her/his 
seat. Subjects were also asked to remove any rings 
from their hands before the scan, and if a ring mark 
was noticed in the scan or in their hands, they were 
asked to return to their seats and rub their hands for a 
bit before returning to the line. 
We discarded a male participant from the control 
condition who reported having had a broken relevant 
finger. The week after the session, we measured the 
digit ratio for each hand using the ruler tool of a general 
purpose photo editing software, and then measured 
again ten days after that. We obtained correlations of 
0.971 and 0.956 for the right and left hands, 
respectively. These results indicated robust 
measurement [66]. The digit ratio measure used in the 
following analyses was the average of first and second 
measurements. The data that support the findings 
reported in this study are openly available in Open 




As expected, participants in condition PN estimated 
(mean ±1 sem) that previous participants´ opinion 
about the most socially appropriate option to divide the 
$50 in the DG would be close to the $25-$25 fair share 
(to keep $26.38 ±0.84), which, in fact, was not 
significantly different from control participants´ reported 
personal norm (to keep $25.29 ±0.5; Mann-Whitney U 
test, U=378, Z=0.47; p=0.64).  
To analyze DG decisions, we report a Tobit 
regression (lower limit: 0; upper limit: 50) with 
condition, the interaction of Condition x Gender, and 
several controls as predictors (see Figure 1). The 
Condition x Gender interaction turned out to be 
significant at the 10% level. Figure 2 and non-
parametric tests allowed us to further explore the 
meaning of that result. Women´s DG decisions showed 
significantly higher generosity after the normative 
estimation exercise than in the Control condition 
(Mann-Whitney U test, U=433, Z=2.68, p<0.007). In 
contrast, the difference in men´s DG decisions between 
PN and Control was not significant (U=523, Z=-0.46, 
p=0.64). Therefore, we found a gender difference in the 
effect of the normative estimation exercise on DG 
decisions. Whereas women showed higher generosity 
after thinking of the prescriptive norm (relative to 
women in the control condition), men did not. 
 
Figure 2: Amount of money (mean ±1 sem) kept by dictators 
(from a total of $50) as a function of gender and condition. 
Control: participants who had no estimation exercise prior to 
the DG decision; PN: participants who estimated the 
Prescriptive Norm before making the DG decision. 
Figure 3 shows the descriptive statistics for right- 
and left-hand digit ratios of women and men from the 
DG Decision (egoism) (1) (2) 
Condition -0.32 (2.63) 45.30 (66.17) 
Gender 0.77 (2.87)  0.90 (2.88) 
Condition * Gender -6.13 (3.65)* -6.76 (3.68)* 
Age  -0.23 (0.24) 
Known participants  -0.42 (0.88) 
Number of previous part  -0.13 (0.52) 
Intercept 38.18 (1.97)**** 43.84 (5.72)**** 
N 178 178 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01; ****P<0.001. 
Figure 1: Coefficients (standard errors) from Tobit regression models. Condition: PN=1, Control=0; Gender: Women=1, Men=0; 
Studies: Economics, Business and Administration=1, Others=0. 
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present Argentine sample. The four sub-samples 
(gender x hand) were all normally distributed (women´s 
right-hand digit ratio: Lilliefors, P>0.20; Shapiro-Wilk 
W=0.99, P>0.87; women´s left-hand digit ratio: 
Lilliefors, P>0.20; Shapiro-Wilk W=0.97, P>0.28; men´s 
right-hand digit ratio: Lilliefors, P>0.20; Shapiro-Wilk 
W=0.98, P>0.75; men´s left-hand digit ratio: Lilliefors, 
P>0.20; Shapiro-Wilk W=0.96, P>0.17). An ANOVA 
with sex as between-subject factor and right/left digit 
ratios as within-subject factors showed a significant 
main effect of sex, F(1, 81)=4.10, p=0.046 (lower mean 
digit ratios for men than women) and of hand, F(1, 
81)=5.38, p=0.023 (lower mean right-hand than left-
hand digit ratios), and an almost significant sex-hand 
interaction, F(1, 81)=3.68, p=0.059. 
We were particularly interested in testing whether 
digit ratios had a modulatory effect on DG decisions as 
a function of condition and gender. With this goal in 
mind, we ran several models of Tobit regressions 
(lower limit: 0; upper limit: 50). Some authors found 
non-linear effects of digit ratios on DG decisions (see 
[63]). Following them, we constructed a variable named 
Quadratic Difference Digit Ratio (QD-DR) which 
involved the second power of a participant´s digit ratio 
minus the mean digit ratio of her/his gender.  
In Figures 4 and 5, we present the results from 
Tobit regression models for women and men done 
separately. The dependent variable was always the 
amount of money kept by the dictator (we also ran the 
regressions with the natural logarithm and log10 of DG 
decisions, but we did not report these results because 
they were qualitatively very similar to the ones 
presented here). Both tables contain 3 models: (1) 
condition (PN=1; Control=0), and left and right digit 
ratios as predictors (we also ran regressions with a 
gender-free measure of digit ratios –by subtracting 
women or men´s average digit ratio to each 
participant´s digit ratio, but we do not report these 
results because they did not qualitatively differ from the 
ones reported); (2) condition, left and right digit ratios, 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Right hand       
Women 37 0.9548 0.9533 0.0284 0.8921 1.0101 
Men 46 0.9467 0.9450 0.0301 0.8796 1.0265 
       
Left hand       
Women 37 0.9652 0.9599 0.0333 0.9066 1.0262 
Men 46 0.9477 0.9445 0.0305 0.8961 1.0087 
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics of digit ratios as a function of hand (right and left) and gender (women and men). 
DG Decision (1) (2) (3) Control (only) 
Condition -7.89(3.27)** -8.26(3.28)** -7.64(3.47)**  
Right DR 30.91(81.39) 19.02(80.92) 23.40(87.19) 74.91(134.97) 
Left DR -70.36(67.39) -69.83(68.77) -71.44(73.11) -139.88(113.42) 
Right Quad Diff DR  -2263 (1752) -2315.24(1799.3) -5671(2486)** 
Left Quad Diff DR  661.43(1251.27) 647.41(1248.70) 2000 (2306) 
Age   -0.07 (0.43) 0.43(0.79) 
Known part   0.09 (1.42) -0.74(2.29) 
Number of prev   -0.03(0.73) 1.62(1.24) 
Politics (left-right)   1.01(1.51) 3.26(3.48) 
Intercept 75.81 (52.37) 78.72(53.34) 82.80 (54.97) 78.02(98.41) 
N 37 37 37 18 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01; ****P<0.001. 
Figure 4: Women only: Tobit regression coefficients (standard errors) for the amount of money kept by the dictator (last column 
includes women only in the control condition). 
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and left and right QD-DR as predictors; and (3) 
condition, left and right digit ratios, left and right QD-DR 
as predictors, and some socio-demographic and 
control variables (i.e., age, left-right politics, known 
participants in the session, and number of previous 
participations in economic experiments). 
As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, the condition 
effect was only significant for women, it was not 
modulated by any measure related to digit ratios, and it 
was robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic and 
other controls. Digit ratios did not modulate the effect of 
condition on decisions for women and men taken 
together either (we did not present these results for 
brevity). Overall, digit ratios or related measures never 
had any significant effect on DG decisions or 
modulated the effect of condition on DG decisions.  
Finally, results from previous research suggest that 
the enactment of gender roles in DG decisions could 
be modulated by whether sessions were run with mixed 
sexes or not [36, 40, 41]. Present sessions all included 
both sexes. Nonetheless, the sex ratio varied across 
sessions (five sessions had a majority of women -63%, 
84%, 64%, 66% and 56%-, one session had 50% 
women; and two sessions had a majority of men -41% 
and 36% women). We ran Tobit regressions (lower 
limit: 0; upper limit=50) with DG decision as dependent 
variable and sex proportion in a session (number of 
women/total), number of women in a session, and 
number of men in a session as predictors. None of 
these predictors resulted significant (all p-values>0.20) 
in the whole sample, the control condition alone, the 
PN condition alone, women alone, or men alone.  
4. DISCUSSION 
In the present study, we found that thinking about 
the prescriptive norm (what others approve) led 
women, but not men, to greater generosity in the 
Dictator Game (DG) relative to control participants who 
made their DG decision without any prior normative 
estimation. This gender effect is consistent with Croson 
and Gneezy´s [29] conclusion that women´s decisions 
in the DG (and their other-regarding preferences more 
generally) are more responsive to social cues than 
those of men (see also [67]).  
The present finding also parallels that of Rand et al. 
[52] who showed that prompting intuition (automatic 
behavior) led women, but not men, towards higher 
altruism in the DG. These authors interpreted their 
results in terms of a gender role effect, namely the 
consequence of socially constructed expectations on 
behavior. According to this view, in many Western 
societies, women are usually expected to be more kind, 
caring, and generous than men [44], and such social 
prescriptions may condition their choices and actions 
[51]. Gong et al. [41] provided converging evidence on 
the presumed effect of social expectations on 
generosity. They did a DG in matrilineal Mosuo, where 
women commonly have a dominant role in household 
economic decisions. These authors found that, in 
contrast to a common pattern found in Western 
societies [30], Mosuan men´s DG offers were much 
higher than those of Mosuan women [41]. 
DG Decision (1) (2) (3) Control (only) 
Condition -2.06(2.67) -1.78(2.71) -0.36(2.91)  
Right DR -2.86(65.78) -7.15(66.11) -42.37(69.31) -64.84(92.25) 
Left DR -29.25(58.87) -31.40(59.37) 10.92(64.69) -21.19(79.92) 
Right Quad Diff DR  -1142 (1337) -1246(1347) -4396(2163)** 
Left Quad Diff DR  569(1301) 824(1295) 2801 (1812) 
Gender (woman=1)   -3.17(2.73) 2.05(3.59) 
Age   -0.28 (0.35) -0.68(0.49) 
Known part   0.23 (1.22) -0.74(2.29) 
Number of prev   0.25(0.69) 2.28(0.85)** 
Politics (left-right)   1.72(1.33) 1.59(1.88) 
Intercept 67.77(44.65) 73.78(44.79)* 66.66(45.73) 89.10(74.29) 
N 37 37 37 18 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01; ****P<0.001. 
Figure 5: Men only: Tobit regression coefficients (standard errors) for the amount of money kept by the dictator (last column 
includes men only in the control condition). 
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Gender Roles Theory also conceives that gender 
effects can be modulated by pre- and post-natal 
hormonal influences [45]. For instance, pre-natal 
exposure to testosterone and estrogens, as indirectly 
measured through 2D:4D digit ratios, could modulate a 
person´s gender role identification [53-55]. Moreover, 
different authors have reported a relationship between 
digit ratios and DG altruism (see [59] for a brief 
overview). Based on these premises, we also 
measured participants´ digit ratios in the present study. 
We focused on this variable as a biological measure 
that could reveal a modulatory effect of pre-natal 
hormonal levels on the interaction between social 
norms and generosity. As expected [56, 63], digit ratios 
showed sexual dimorphism, having women higher digit 
ratios than men in the present sample. Nonetheless, 
we could not find evidence that digit ratios modulated 
the effect of prescriptive norms on DG decisions. This 
result inclines us to conclude in a similar vein than 
Rand et al. [52] and Gong et al. [41], namely that the 
gender difference found is likely due to divergent social 
pressures towards women and men. (Of course, there 
may be other biological sexual differences not 
measured here that may explain present findings). A 
limitation of the present study is that we did not ask 
participants to report their explicit sex role identification 
[68], which could have provided convergent evidence 
on the role of socialization into gender roles and 
stereotypes. Interestingly, women did not show higher 
generosity than men in the control condition, thus 
suggesting that focusing participants´ attention towards 
the prescriptive norm, as posed in the Norm Focus 
Theory [19], was the crucial element allowing the 
gender difference in altruism to appear. This result of a 
gendered effect of prescriptive norms on generosity 
contrasts with that of Croson, Handy, and Shang [69] 
who found that men´s intended donations to a 
hypothetical public radio station were more sensitive 
than women´s to information of the descriptive social 
norm (others´ donations). There are countless 
differences between Croson et al.´s and the present 
study, but among the main distinctions is the fact that 
decisions in their study were hypothetical, implying that 
their male participants could be inexpensively self-
promoting themselves by conforming to the descriptive 
norm. 
Beyond the effect of norms on generosity, results 
from the present control condition contribute to 
discussions in two other fronts.  
First, as others before [59], we found a relationship 
between digit ratios and plain DG altruism (i.e., in the 
control condition). Brañas-Garza and collaborators [63] 
interpreted such relationship as indicating that 
“biological and genetic factors play an important role in 
social norm transmission” (p. 8). The present significant 
correlation of digit ratios with decisions from the control 
condition but not with decisions from the normative 
condition could be interpreted to suggest otherwise. 
For instance, pre-natal hormonal effects on generosity 
could be mediated by differences in other-regarding 
preferences, such as, empathic concern, more than by 
variation in mechanisms of norm compliance. Indeed, 
previous findings negatively link pre-natal testosterone 
levels with empathic abilities [70], and positively link 
empathy with altruism [33, 71].  
In more detail, we found that control participants 
with more extreme right-hand digit ratio showed higher 
generosity. This contrasts with results from Brañas-
Garza et al. [63] and Galizzi and Nieboer [59] who 
found that Caucasian participants with more extreme 
digit ratios were more selfish in the DG. Nonetheless, 
Galizzi and Nieboer [59] did not find any relationship 
between digit ratios and DG altruism with non-
Caucasian participants (Chinese, South Asian, Black, 
and others). Indeed, digit ratios present strong ethnic 
variability [56]. A limitation of the present study is that 
we did not ask participants about their ethnic origin. We 
believe that asking about ethnicity would be an unusual 
request in Argentina; for instance, it would have made 
no sense for participants to identify themselves as 
Caucasian or not because this is not a category that it 
is heard of in this country. In any case, genetic studies 
confirm that the population of Argentina is the result of 
the intermixing between several groups, including 
Indigenous American, European, and African 
populations. The average ancestry for the Argentine 
sample is approximately 65% European (95%CI: 63–
68%), 31% Indigenous American (28–33%) and 4% 
African (3–4%) [72, 73]. More specifically, people from 
the Province of Buenos Aires (where the present study 
was run) show 76% (95%CI: 73–79%) of European 
ancestry [72]; though such European ancestry is far 
from homogenous, having dominant groups with 
ancestry from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy [73]. 
Therefore, it is possible that the reported difference in 
the association of right-hand quadratic digit ratio with 
DG decisions between the present study and those of 
Brañas-Garza et al. [63] and Galizzi and Nieboer [59] is 
linked to ethnic differences between the present 
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sample and theirs. In any case, it is important to note, 
however, that the descriptive statistics of digit ratios of 
different populations of Caucasian participants [59, 63], 
and even different samples of the same population 
(university students from the University of Granada [63, 
74]) may differ significantly. We do not know at the 
present the origin and implications of such variability. In 
addition, another limitation of the present study is the 
small sample size used compared to that used in the 
studies by Brañas-Garza et al. [63] and Galizzi and 
Nieboer [59]. This makes present results relatively less 
reliable. Last, to have in mind, other reports found no 
significant association between variation in digit ratios 
and variations in altruism [42, 60], which suggests that 
that relationship seems rather unreliable. 
Second, present results from the control condition 
also contribute to the ongoing debate on gender and 
altruism [29-32]. Whereas some studies report women 
being more generous than men, this pattern is not 
always found (see the introduction for references). 
Indeed, control participants´ decisions in the present 
protocol (a plain DG) did not show evidence of a 
gender effect at all. Boschini et al. [40] showed that a 
gender effect on altruism could be made 
appear/disappear as a function of whether sessions 
were run with mixed genders or not. In fact, a gender 
effect on generosity was only evident when gender was 
primed (participants were asked to report it in the 
beginning) in mixed-gender sessions [40]. In the 
present protocol, we ran sessions with differing 
proportions of women and men which allowed us to 
incorporate information about the gender composition 
of each session as a predictor in regression analyses. 
Nevertheless, we could not find any significant effect of 
this factor on women´s or men´s generosity. To have in 
mind, Boschini et al. [40] found a gender effect on 
generosity only when participants stated their gender 
before making their DG decision in mixed-gender 
sessions, whereas, in the present protocol, participants 
stated their gender in the post-decision questionnaire. 
This difference could suggest that the gender norm 
needs to be psychologically active to interact with the 
gender composition of the session. Nonetheless, the 
gender differential effect of prescriptive norms on 
generosity in the present study suggests that gender 
norms may have been activated in the normative 
condition. In any case, gender proportions across 
sessions did not modulate the present normative effect 
either. This could be simply due to lack of sufficient 
variation in gender proportions across sessions. We 
need further research to explore this possibility in more 
depth.  
In brief, we found that women, but not men, were 
led to higher generosity when they thought of the 
socially appropriate behavior in a DG before deciding 
how to share a monetary pie (relative to a control 
condition without any normative focus before the 
decision). This gender effect was not modulated by a 
sex-dimorphic variable such as participants´ 2D:4D 
digit ratios, which was included as a proxy of pre-natal 
exposure to testosterone and estrogens. In conclusion, 
present results are consistent with the idea that social 
norms may affect generosity through socialization into 
gender roles. Finally, the fact that digit ratios correlated 
with decisions in the control condition but not in the 
normative condition suggests that the presumed effect 
of pre-natal testosterone on generosity could be 
mediated by variations in empathic concern more than 
by differences in psychological mechanisms of norm 
compliance.  
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